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EPILOGUE: TURNING TO THE WALL 
Concepts across Space and Time
This special issue of the Review of International American Studies has grappled with the power of walls as idea, rhetoric, 
policy, and embodied experience. Moving beyond the question 
of whether walls ‘work,’ our authors have probed what walls 
do, and what people do with walls in history, politics, culture, 
and everyday life. 
The Wall as RheToRic and Policy
In her incisive introduction to this issue, Virginia Dominguez 
probes the power of the wall—a seemingly illogical idea, a solution 
proven ineffective by plenty of historical cases, yet enjoying sup-
port across party lines in the United States. She is fascinated with 
the potency “of this atavistic idea in an era of alleged globalization, 
when so much rhetorical energy focuses on cyberspace, the global-
ization of manufacturing and service jobs, and the technological 
advances that allow people to work from home, hold meetings 
for free with people in many different countries, and stay closely 
connected with family and friends regardless of location” (Domin-
guez, this issue). Yet, I venture to ask, how much of candidate 
and President Trump’s idea of building a Mexican border wall has 
to do not with logic and binaries, but with offering a tangible, 
producerist entity to the American people? When globalization 
and cybersecurity are abstract worlds, a wall is solid, created, put 
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and hold on to, a concrete and specific expression of anxiety, 
identity, and border. 
Dominguez recognizes that “the wall has rhetorical power 
and galvanizing power—racist power and xenophobic power,” 
but boldly predicts that President Trump’s wall will not be built. 
She may prove to be right precisely because an actual wall would 
be tested against the president’s claims, and Trump’s rhetoric relies 
on intangible, extra-factual images and assertions. Yet I believe 
that this prediction may prove to be wrong. If there will be 
any tangible legacy left behind by a president who does not care 
about facts or logic or conditions on the ground, it will be a big 
and beautiful wall. Donald Trump is a businessman of real estate 
and building: he deals in constructing and profiting from hotels, 
casinos, and golf courses. What he may leave behind may be 
a wall—not a legacy of any coherent policy—but a wall (and later, 
a “tremendous,” “beautiful” presidential library). Only posterity will 
get to appreciate the bizarre irony of this—we in the here and now 
are too busy struggling over President Trump’s politics and policies.
The Wall as a sTaTe of Mind
Several articles in this issue grapple with the complexities 
of what walls ‘give’ the populations they are supposed to protect. 
As Gabriela Vargas-Cetina and Steffan Igor Ayora-Díaz (this issue) 
explain, the historical dynamic of peninsular smuggling, Mexican 
blockades, isolation and secessionism powerfully shaped Yucate-
can identity and lifeways. Their description of the role of these 
relations in the Yucatan peninsula’s connections to Anglo-North 
America and the Caribbean echoed my own impression of the his-
tory of Scotland: Scottish reassertions of independence developed 
that nation’s connections with continental Europe as against 
the ‘colonizing’ efforts of the English. These are instances when 
actual and more general walls and passages shape the identity, 
or at least foreign relations, of a country or region. Yet it is not 
necessarily inevitable that the influence of globalization will erode 
the traditional ‘walls’ of Yucatecan identity. Like the Scots, young 
Yucatecans may also update their traditions to a global world 























In her turn, Éva Szabó (this issue) deconstructs the Western 
European (liberal) historical analogy that the recent Hungarian 
and other Eastern and Southern European border fence, erected 
at the height of the migrant crisis, is nothing but a new Iron Curtain. 
Szabó historicizes and contextualizes European attitudes towards 
walls by recovering the original function of the Iron Curtain as a wall 
built by Communist governments against emigration from within 
their own Eastern Bloc—of keeping people in, not out. According 
to Szabó, Western Europe’s historical experience with migration 
developed a welcoming attitude precisely partly because of the Iron 
Curtain: in general, the resulting migrants and refugees were simi-
lar to them (Europeans or colonial subjects), willing to integrate, 
often highly skilled, and during the Cold War came in controlled 
bursts. The wall eventually came down in what was regarded 
as a triumph for democracy, and this has been taken as a les-
son against wall-building that Western Europeans and liberals 
falsely apply to the defensive border fence built by governments 
in Eastern Europe during the migrant crisis of the 2010s. Thus, 
the very societies who were once protected by the Iron Curtain 
now do not understand why those historically on the other side 
have decided to build their own defensive wall. 
Beyond its astute historical argument, Szabó’s piece can also 
challenge us to think about what walls do to people they are 
supposed to protect—how such communities are shaped by their 
barriers, and what they lose by living on the ‘safe’ side of the wall. 
In what ways do the walls of Fortress Britain, Fortress Europe, 
Fortress Israel, or Fortress America lock their own people in, 
while—or instead of—keeping them safe? Is there a ‘wall mentality’ 
among border populations, in a good or a bad sense?
As Sangjun Jeong’s article (this issue) argues, the people of South 
Korea cultivate—in Robert Frost’s words, ‘mend’—their own mental 
walls even as many of them want to reunite their country with 
the North. According to Jeong, starting as a casually drawn line 
on a National Geographic map, the Demilitarized Zone not only 
became one of the world’s most heavily armed buffer zones, 
but it has been the symbol of at least two competing histories 
within South Korean society. One of these is patriotic, anti-North 

























and for re-unification. As Jeong shows, South Koreans, the very 
people whom the ‘wall’ of the DMZ is supposed to protect, are 
still politically and culturally waging the Korean War amongst 
themselves—over six decades after that conflict putatively ended.
The Wall as socio-PoliTical MeTaPhoR: a foRTRess undeR siege
What if we thought about what walls are a part of—the larger 
thing? My own Hungarian conceptual heritage tells me that walls are 
part of a fortress. A central image of Hungarian historical memory 
is the early modern fort, defended by a small garrison of Magyars 
against the invaders, usually the Ottoman Turks. In our public 
school canon is Géza Gárdonyi’s fin-de-siécle romantic historical 
novel set during the 1552 siege of Eger (Gárdonyi). In elementary 
school we were required to memorize the oath that the Hungar-
ian commander made the whole garrison take to defend the fort 
at all costs.1 This scenario posited that the fort was the only thing 
standing between the ruthless Turkish invaders and the rest 
of Hungary, which was defenseless against this kind of an army. 
This was an apocalyptic scene. 
I dwell on this because if we understand walls as meton-
ymy—the part standing for the whole—we may see the rest 
of the concept that they invoke: a fort under siege. A siege is not 
only a discrete event—it is also a mindset. Think of the slogan 
“No surrender” used in a variety of cultural contexts and regional 
geographies. The scarf worn and the song sung at the Glasgow 
Rangers football (soccer) games bearing the words “No Surrender” 
refer not only to the specific game or even necessarily to the team’s 
sports values, but to the historic siege of cities in the Ulster province 
of Northern Ireland by ‘Catholic’ forces, and defended by the Ulster 
Scots—all in the 17th century.2 In the Glasgow football subculture 
1. Administered to the defenders by Captain István Dobó, the oath read, 
“I swear to the one living God that I consecrate my life to the defense 
of the fortress of Eger, for king and homeland. Neither force nor trickery 
will intimidate me. Neither money nor promises will make me falter. I will 
neither talk nor listen to talk about giving up the fort. I will not surrender 
to the enemy alive inside or outside this fortress. From beginning to end 
of the defense, I will obey the orders of my superiors. May God so help me.” 
Translation from Hungarian by Tóth. (Gárdonyi, Egri Csillagok 304).






















of Celtics versus Rangers, this historical memory evokes sectarian 
and ethnic (Protestant vs. Catholic, Scots vs. Irish) hatred. Along 
with the seasonal marches of the members of Glasgow’s Orange 
Lodges in some parts of the city, these rituals are more symbolic 
and subcultural3 than the dangerous and explosive annual march-
ing season in Northern Ireland. 
The siege as socio-political metaphor (which, I posit, may be 
the logical extension of the wall) functions not only in Northern 
Ireland, but in other epochs and geographies. The ideological 
and physical walls of that region discussed in this issue by Laura 
McAtackney date back to the time when the Crown encour-
aged Scots to populate what became the Ulster province 
of (Northern) Ireland in the 17th century. These people were 
often Protestant, and those later migrating to colonial America 
became known as the Scots Irish. However, in Northern Ireland 
they knew themselves as “The Plantation.”4 Their enclaves sup-
ported by the metropole and its regional elite, but surrounded 
by a sea of Irish Catholic communities, some of the very identity 
of the Plantation Scots came to be rooted in their experiences 
of the sieges and other confrontations between these ethnici-
ties and denominations under recurring royal power plays. But 
if I as a historian can take the liberty to be ahistorical, how 
much is this conceptually different from the historical memory 
of the Anglo-Texan US population? What London/Derry city was 
for the Scots-Irish in the 17th century and has been since, the Alamo 
was for Anglo-Texans in the mid-19th century and has been since.5 
3. For more on sectarianism in Scotland, see “Scottish Football ‘a Cause 
of Sectarianism’” and Bruce.
4. For more on the Ulster Plantation and its legacy, see Montgomery.
5. The historical memory of the conflict between the Anglo settlers 
and the Mexican government in the territory of Texas in 1835–36 has been 
enshrined by and for the dominant Euro-American population of the United 
States as a war of independence for Texas. One episode of this conflict was 
the defense of the Alamo mission building by Anglo-Texans against Mexican 
government troops in 1836, where all of the defenders were killed. The im-
mediate understanding of the siege as martyrdom by patriotic Texans for their 
cause helped them win their war against Mexico later that year. The Alamo 
continues to be a place of pilgrimage for Texans and other US Americans. 
For the differences between the historical memory of the past of Texas 

























“No Surrender” may also apply to the siege mentality of the Rus-
sians in Kaliningrad6—and of the Russian ethnics in other parts 
of the Baltics,7 or to Mother Russia’s historical memory of World 
War Two.8 
The insidious thing about the siege as mental image is that 
it securitizes thinking, erases or suppresses diversity and inter-
nal dissent, and mobilizes people in a logic to ‘hold the wall.’ 
This is what makes it so appealing: it gives one something to do, 
while it simplifies one’s thinking. ‘Man’ the wall, mount a defense, 
make a stand—this is its message. When we struggle to under-
stand, much less to combat the impersonal forces of globalization, 
deindustrialization, and the random horrendous strikes of terror-
ism, the wall offers us, in the words of West Wing writer Aaron 
Sorkin, “an enemy I can kill.”9 
Other authors have discussed the entities beyond the wall 
in the minds of those who think of themselves as defenders 
of the fortress. Tom Englehardt’s 1995 book The End of Victory 
Culture: Cold War America and the Disillusioning of a Generation 
is only one such example (Englehardt). Even without knowing 
his cultural history of ‘the last stand’ scene in US culture, we can 
imagine that on the other side of the wall are the faceless mul-
titudes, hordes of barbarians attacking Rome, bloodthirsty 
savage Indians trying to overrun the emigrant train or Custer’s 
beleaguered troopers, criminal evildoers (candidate Trump’s “bad 
hombres”) (Jacobo), the terrorists hiding among Syrian and Afghan 
refugees (as for the Hungarian government), or like in the 2016 
6. Kaliningrad has been a non-contiguous part of the Russian Federation 
and its predecessors since 1945, surrounded by populations of Lithuanians, 
Polish, and Germans. 
7. Russian-speaking ethnics comprise ca. 6% of the population in Lithu-
ania, 27% in Latvia, and 25% in Estonia. “Baltic States Concerned About 
Large Russian Minority.”
8. Russian historical memory of World War Two frames the conflict 
as “The Great Patriotic War / in Defense of the Homeland,” and in its post-
war version drew lessons from it that call for greater security, a stronger 
military—measures to prevent another similar in-depth invasion of Russia 
by a foreign power. For more on the historical memory of the Second World 
War in Russia, see Bernstein.























movie The Great Wall, which depicts Matt Damon as a European 
mercenary patrolling the Great Wall of China not the Huns or other 
nomadic tribes, but multitudes of computer-generated monsters 
unleashed from some seventh hell of Hollywood’s ancient world. 
Our supreme challenge as critical thinkers is to make of those 
on the other side of the wall anything other than infernal, sub-
human creatures to be kept out at all costs. 
Also worthy of discussion is the gendered nature of the wall—
the fortress, and the siege—as concepts. Gárdonyi’s novel features 
a strong Hungarian female character, Éva Cecey, whose agency 
is expressed in transgressing her gender role by entering the besieged 
fort with assistance, cooking and feeding the fort’s defenders, don-
ning a soldier’s armor, and fighting against the Turks during their 
final assault (Gárdonyi, Part Five). An iconic 19th century painting 
about the same siege depicts women in similar roles in this last 
scene—‘manning’ the wall (Székely). In other words, the women 
in the fort can transgress their gender role, but only temporar-
ily, and only in the defense of the fort—as part of the war effort. 
As Susan Faludi’s 2007 book The Terror Dream: What 9/11 Revealed 
About America documented, such a national/community emergency 
constricts and regresses not only democratic exchange but also 
gender roles, suppressing dissent and free expression by women, 
and forcing them into socio-political roles prescribed by conservative 
social and historical memory: the damsel in distress, the grieving 
widow/mother/sister/daughter, the supportive female family 
member, or the maiden looking for safety and security in marriage.
“gaTed coMMuniTies” BuilT By Walls, inc.
But if in our mental structures, historical memory, and political 
rhetoric walls are built and guarded by nation states or empires, 
are they so in reality? In their investigation of how Israel’s Sepa-
ration Wall is perceived by Palestinians on one side and Jews 
on the other, Amalia Sa’ar, Sarai B. Aharoni, and Alisa Lewin 
(this issue) discuss Jewish “gated communities” nestled along 
the wall. This case of privately developed real estate being in a sym-
biotic relationship with the nation state’s security structure 
challenges us to probe our concepts of the private—not only 

























public projects versus the private, for-profit security and building 
contractors work on government contracts—in Israel, as in the US 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, as on the US-Mexico border. Are 
government and national security bleeding into privatized secu-
rity and infrastructure? Whose national security is protecting 
whose gated communities—and against/from whom? More, 
are such transfers of power and control from national to private 
a characteristic feature of our globalized world, where borders are 
(sub)contracted by the state to Walls, Inc.?
oPening WhaT is closed doWn: The Wall as gaTeWay
As of this writing (January 2018), President of the United 
States Donald J. Trump is again turning to the wall in his policy. 
The president is in discussions with Congressional leaders about 
the United States budget, which for him revolves around his 
plan to build the border wall with Mexico (“President Meets with 
Congressional Leaders”). Yet not only, as it has been pointed 
out, do walls not fully ‘work’ as they are supposed to—they do 
not always fulfil the purposes or functions they were originally built 
for. Walls condition the region around them, but they do not fully, 
or exclusively, seal off communication and circulation. Discussing 
the ancient walls of Rome, Giorgio Mariani reminds us that “the 
Latin word limes had a double meaning. On the one hand, it meant 
‘border,’ ‘limit,’ ‘dividing line.’ On the other, it was a synonym 
for ‘road’ or ‘way,’ as was the case with the Germanic-Augustan 
limes running along the Lippe river, instrumental to the creation 
of the new province of the Empire’ (Mariani, this issue). If we 
expand our concepts from the specificity of walls to the bigger 
category of limes that includes other natural and human-made 
landscapes, such as mountain ridges and rivers, this concept 
opens us up to more diverse interpretations. In this sense of walls 
and wall-ness as border-ness, limes is also liminality, which could 
also mean in-between-ness, but has the potential to straddle 
borders, to transcend them, struggle with them, go above, under, 
and beyond them. In this sense, trans-wall can be trans-border, 
and even trans-national. This leads us back to the recovery and re-
examination of trans-border economies, societies, and flows, along 






















Once we start seeing walls as tools of connection (such as traffic 
on or along the wall as much as across it), then we can also under-
stand some functions of border rivers. Thus, these constructions 
or contour features may serve to facilitate communication, com-
merce, and transfers of culture, goods, ideas, as well as bodies. 
Whether as a wall’s original functions, its evolved functions over 
time, or the active subversion of its original functions, these are 
all there at least potentially, ‘built into’ the wall.
If some artists claim that they only ‘liberate’ a statue’s figure 
from the surrounding stone, clay or wood, Jasmin Habib may have 
captured a similar creative practice in her essay (this issue) about 
art and culture along the walls of the Wadi Nisnas neighborhood 
of Haifa, Israel. Habib shows how through humor and art, the resi-
dents and activists have ‘opened’ walls up to messages that are 
only obliquely political, and reflect on their struggles to coexist 
in a landscape riven by nationalist and sectarian structures. 
The art that recognizes and sublimates histories of displacement 
and Israeli and Palestinian identities includes a humorous panel 
commentary regarding the street’s paved asphalt, olive tree 
imagery ‘growing out’ of a wall, figures of an Israeli and a Palestin-
ian child ‘opening’ a window on the side of a building, and a dove 
taking flight on yet  another wall surface. Out of what is regarded 
as one of the most intractable conflicts of the early 21st century, 
this wall art reimagines the dividing lines as a ‘soft/ening’ border, 
or a springboard for future peace. 
According to Mariani, the Benedictine monk Giulio Meiattini 
“believes the door to be a more suggestive and flexible image 
for the kind of open, though always discerning connection between 
inside and outside, between ‘us’ and ‘them’” (Mariani, this issue). 
Vargas-Cetina and Ayora-Díaz likewise pointed out that “Walls have 
to have doors, and also may be overcome by going above them, 
by air or by bridges, or going under them, by tunnels” (this issue). 
They discussed various concepts that connect instead of only 
separating sides: roads, bridges, and tunnels. Indeed, the concept 
that literally splits the wall and breaks through it conceptually is not 
the bastion of the fortress; it is the gate. While each gate may 
be guarded and closed, what begins as deterrence and checkpoint 

























Charlie did in the Berlin section of the Iron Curtain. One of the rea-
sons that the wall came down in Berlin was that in November 1989 
the border guards had no clear instructions on how to respond 
to people’s attempts to transcend the Cold War border that had been 
inscribed in stone, steel, barbed wire, and lead. This new vacuum 
of political power was exposed in a matter of hours, and the system 
of the wall subsequently collapsed. 
The national/istic building of walls in the United States may 
be more vulnerable to criticism than elsewhere because of that 
nation state’s myths of origin. Alejandro Lugo’s photo-essay pays 
particular attention to US national iconography and mythology 
as encoded around and reinterpreted by the existing parts of the US-
Mexican border fence. For him, the nondescript figures standing 
by the wall and looking out into the distance stretching from 
the US flag waving above them are “In Search of the American 
Dream/Buscando del Sueño Americano”; the couple in ethnic Latino 
festival clothing walking towards a relief monument depicting 
a 19th century settler family are “Twenty-First Century Pioneers 
in Arizona/Pioneros del Siglo Veinte-y-Uno en Arizona”; and he 
makes a point of capturing what seems to the viewer the accusatory 
gaze of a mural of an “American Eagle at the Calexico-Mexicali 
Wall.” Extrapolating from the US defensive border fence, Lugo’s 
photographs assert that the “Fenced White House Welcomes 
Latino Immigrants (2006–2016) / La Casa Blanca Encerrada 
da Bienvenida a Inmigrantes Latinos (2006–2016),” and even more 
pointedly, that the “Statue of Liberty Turns Its Back on Mexican 
Immigrants/ La Estatua de la Libertad le da la Espalda a Inmi-
grantes Mexicanos” (Lugo, this issue). 
This last shot of Lugo’s explicitly criticizes the border fence 
for contradicting one of the United States’ foundational tenets: that 
it is ‘a nation of immigrants.’ In this, Lugo invokes a tradition of art 
for social reform. Emma Lazarus’ poem about the Statue of Liberty 
which was originally gifted to the US by the French in the 1880s, 
depicted the statue as the latter-day incarnation of the giant figure 
that had formed a gate to the port of ancient Rhodes. Lazarus’ 
“modern colossus” now marked one major European entry point 






















since the late 19th century,10 Lady Liberty has been actively invit-
ing and greeting the world’s immigrants and exiles—even as US 
immigration regulations have tried to restrict them by ethnicity, 
country, and ideology. 
There is much that is powerful in the wall as an idea and mental 
image in rhetoric, policy, landscape, and embodied experience. Fences 
and walls divide, sort out and categorize complexity into two sides 
whose meeting they control. They also homogenize diversity by forc-
ing human beings, their ideas, cultures and practices to conform 
to those of either this or that side. This is most often what they are 
built to do. Walls may not always or fully ‘work’ for the purposes they 
are designed; yet they work in other, sometimes oblique, but pow-
erful, insidious, sad, or delightful ways. The real struggle over their 
meaning lies in their interaction with their human environment; 
and this may change over time. Even when our politics and societ-
ies are ‘turning to the wall,’ our walls may retain some openness 
to meaning and exchange. Unlocking these may help change both 
the understanding and the enactment of the walls of our world.
10. For one interpretation of Lazarus’ poem in the context of post-9/11 US 
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